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At this stage of the 2016 election cycle, which party will control the White House and the US Senate
come January 2017 seems to be very much up in the air. The US House of Representatives on the
other hand, is almost certain to remain in the hands of the Republican Party, a situation which is
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Anthony J. McGann, Charles Anthony Smith,
Michael Latner and Alex Keena argue that the GOP’s continued control of the House is down to
the gerrymandering of Congressional districts by Republican-controlled state legislatures. They
write that in certain states like Pennsylvania, this gerrymandering leads to an asymmetry between
the number of seats the Democrats gain and their vote share, reducing their share of US House
seats.
Although the Presidential race now appears close, the Republicans will in all likelihood retain control
of the House of Representatives in 2016, even if the Democrats win a substantial majority of the
popular vote. This is the result of partisan gerrymandering – the way that state legislatures have
drawn the Congressional boundaries following the 2010 Census. In our new book Gerrymandering
in America we show that the Democrats would need to win between 54 percent and 55 percent of
the vote to have any chance of retaking the House – a result comparable to that of 2008 when
Barack Obama was first elected.
Of course, partisan gerrymandering has always existed in the United States. What has changed
since 2010 is the magnitude and impact of the bias. Before 2010 partisan bias had been relatively
minor, at least since the Supreme Court decided in the 1960s that all Congressional districts must
have approximately equal population. However, by our calculations, partisan bias tripled in the
districting round that followed the 2010 Census. Previously partisan gerrymandering was an
idiosyncrasy of the American political process; now it determines the composition of the House.
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This increase in partisan bias from 2010 followed the Supreme Court’s decision in 2004 that there was no standard
for adjudicating cases of partisan gerrymandering. The actual judgment in Vieth v. Jubelirer is complex, as there
was no majority opinion. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by three other Justices, argued that no standard existed, and
that political gerrymandering was inherently non-justiciable – it was a political matter in which the Court had no
business intervening. A fifth Justice (Justice Anthony Kennedy) agreed that no standard existed, but did not exclude
the possibility that one might one day be found. The effect, however, was the same. State governments did not have
to fear judicial reprimand, so they were free to push partisan gerrymandering to the limit.
In Gerrymandering in America we measure the degree of partisan bias in every state. It is notable that in the
majority of states there is no significant partisan bias. However, in the 18 states where we do find partisan bias, this
is often extreme. The degree of asymmetry (the degree to which the two parties do not get the same number of
seats for getting the same share of the vote) is above 30 percent in nine states. It is notable that the states where
we find statistically significant bias are nearly all states where the state legislature draws the districts, and one party
controls the entire process.
To illustrate, we can present our results graphically for two states. Figures 1 and 2 show the percentage of the seats
the Democratic Party would get in each state with the current districting plan, if it got a certain percentage of the
vote. This assumes approximately uniform partisan swings (the relative patterns of support for each party in different
districts remains approximately constant, although there is a random effect to take idiosyncratic and local factors
into account). The central line is the percentage of seat the Democrats would win, while the upper and lower dotted
lines are the 95 percent error bounds.
Figure 1 – Percentage of seats Democratic Party would gain in Minnesota
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The districting plan in Minnesota is unbiased. As we can see, the graph is symmetric – both parties are treated
equally. The graph also passes through the 50/50 point – if a party wins 50 percent of the vote, it expects to win 50
percent of the seats.  Minnesota is also highly responsive – if a party wins 1 percent more of the vote, it expects to
win 3 percent more of the seats on average.
Figure 2 – Percentage of seats Democratic Party would gain in Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, things are very different. The seats-votes function is highly asymmetric – both parties are not
treated equally. The asymmetry score is actually 36 percent in favor of the Republicans (where 0 percent is
unbiased and 100 percent means one party get all the seats even if it only gets 45 percent of the vote). If both
parties get 50 percent of the vote, the Republicans get a 20 percent advantage – they get 70 percent of the seats. Of
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course, in 2012 the Republicans took 13 out of 18 seats in Pennsylvania, even though the Democrats won more
votes. The districting plans in Alabama, Mississippi and Missouri are even more biased than Pennsylvania, and
North Carolina, Louisiana, Ohio, Virginia, South Carolina and Tennessee are not far behind.
In our book, we debunk that myth that partisan bias is the inevitable result of the fact that Democratic voters tend to
be concentrated in urban areas. It turns out that the states with the largest urban concentrations of Democrats (New
York, New Jersey, California, Illinois) are precisely where the districting plans are not biased against the Democrats.
Furthermore, thanks to publically available computer districting software, we can see that it is possible to draw
unbiased (or only modestly biased) districts in every state. (See the work of Altman and MacDonald 1 2 3, and
Wolf). We also debunk the idea that the increase in partisan bias is a result of majority minority districts – the states
that added majority minority districts in 2010 (notably California) are not where we find partisan bias.
However, the issue of partisan gerrymandering may well be revisited by the Supreme Court in the coming years.
The decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), which gave a green light to the current round of partisan districting, was 5-
4. Following the death of Justice Scalia (who wrote the plurality opinion), it is no longer clear that there is a majority
in the Court in support of this decision. Of course, the future direction of the Court will depend on the outcome of the
Presidential election in November.
This article is based on the authors’ new book, Gerrymandering in America (Cambridge, 2016). 
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